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making objective was the type of
referral sales program the Iowa
legislature wanted to prohibit.
Santa Rosa's Misrepresentations
The court then turned to the
issue of misrepresentation of potential earnings and the program's
legality. Santa Rosa admitted that
certain brokers misrepresented the
dollar amounts purchasers could
earn. However, Santa Rosa argued
that it was not responsible, because
"renegade brokers" made the misrepresentations. The supreme
court disagreed for two reasons.
First, broker training materials
contained assurances of quick and
easy money. Second, Santa Rosa
failed to develop a system to monitor either the new brokers or their
training. Therefore, the supreme
court held that Santa Rosa could
not disclaim responsibility for the
misrepresentations of its brokers.
Santa Rosa also admitted that
its brokers misrepresented the program's legality, but again denied
responsibility for renegade brokers. The supreme court rejected
Santa Rosa's claim as meritless
and found the misrepresentations
traceable directly to Santa Rosa's
broker training materials. For example, in a document entitled
"Questions Most Frequently
Asked About The Santa Rosa
Plan," the first question on the
document was "1. Q. Is this plan
legal? A. Yes!" However, Santa
Rosa made no attempt to determine whether its program was in
compliance with Iowa law until
four months after Santa Rosa sales
began. As a result of these misrepresentations, the Iowa Supreme
Court found Santa Rosa liable for
violating the state's Consumer
Fraud Act.
Remaining Issues
The supreme court partially reversed the trial court and held that
violations of the Door-to-Door
Sales Act and lottery statute were
not unfair practices as defined by
the Iowa consumer fraud statute.
The court reasoned that the legislature's failure to include violations
of the Act or lottery statute as
unfair practices revealed an intent
to exclude them.
Next, Santa Rosa argued that
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since the restitution fund was designed solely to reimburse Iowa
residents who made purchases
from Santa Rosa, the trial court
erred when it awarded the unclaimed balance to the Iowa Consumer Education and Litigation
Fund. The supreme court agreed
and directed the trial court on
remand to return any undistributed portion of the restitution fund
to Santa Rosa.
The court then turned to the
imposition of the civil penalty.
Santa Rosa contended that no penalty should have been awarded
because renegade brokers violated
the law without Santa Rosa's consent or encouragement. The supreme court concluded that Santa
Rosa impliedly authorized and encouraged the ideas and sales techniques used by the brokers and
therefore, the civil penalty was
appropriate.
Next, the court examined the
personal liability of Santa Rosa's
owner, Groeschel. The supreme
court upheld the trial court finding
that Groeschel's liability arose as a
consequence of his complete control of Santa Rosa and his own
personal acts in perpetrating consumer fraud.
Lastly, the supreme court held
that the award of prejudgment
interest was improper because the
state legislature intended to exclude prejudgment interest from
the definition of restitution in the
consumer fraud statute.
Judy Koehler

Negligent Termite
Inspector Can Be Liable
To Forseeable
Subsequent Home
Purchasers
In Hosford v. State Termite and
Pest Control, Inc., 589 So. 2d 108
(Miss. 1991), the Supreme Court of
Mississippi held that a pest control
operator, who negligently inspected residential property in the process of being sold, may be liable to
forseeable subsequent purchasers
of the house.
Background
In 1986, Jim and Judy Hosford

("the Hosfords") hired McCrary
Real Estate, Inc. in an effort to buy
a home in Columbus, Mississippi.
On July 11, 1986, the Hosfords,
through the services of McCrary
Real Estate, agreed to purchase a
house and received the corresponding warranty deed. For procedural purposes, title first was
transferred to Johnny Mack
McCrary ("McCrary"), principal
in McCrary Real Estate, who then
transferred the property to the
Hosfords.
Before the closing, McCrary contacted State Termite and Pest Control, Inc. ("State Termite") and
requested an inspection of the property for possible termite damage.
Steve McKissack ("the Inspector"),
a pest control specialist employed
by State Termite, performed an
inspection of the premises and prepared a report stating the results.
The report listed Charles Smith as
the current owner of the property
and McCrary, individually, as the
purchaser. The report was one of
the documents submitted at the
closing of the property purchase in
July, 1986.
The Inspector's report stated
that there was no infestation or
damage from wood-destroying insects on the property. The inspection covered the readily accessible
areas of the property, but did not
include areas that were obstructed
or inaccessible at the time of inspection. The report also stated
that it was not a structural damage
report nor a warranty as to the
absence of wood-destroying insects.
In January, 1988, nineteen
months after the inspection, Jim
Hosford noticed conditions suggesting termite infestation and
damage. He had the property inspected by a carpenter and, later,
by two employees of the Pest Control Section of the United States
Department of Agriculture. These
parties reported substantial termite infestation and damage that
had existed for more than two
years and possibly as long as fifteen
years. The parties also agreed that
the damage should have been discovered if the recent, June, 1986
inspection by State Termite had
been performed competently.
(continued on page 68)
67

Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

Negligent Inspector
(continued from page 67)

The Hosfords consequently sued
State Termite and the Inspector
alleging negligence and several other theories of recovery.
Circuit Court Proceedings
In the Circuit Court of Lowndes
County, Mississippi, State Termite
did not deny that a pest control
operator is held to a duty of reasonable care similar to that imposed
upon anyone providing expert or
specialized services to the public.
Rather, State Termite claimed
there was no contract between
State Termite and the Hosfords,
and therefore, the Hosfords had no
basis for their suit. The circuit
court agreed. State Termite had
contracted with McCrary and
therefore the Hosfords lacked privity of contract. Further, the court
ruled that State Termite could not
have foreseen that the Hosfords
would rely on the inspection report. The circuit court granted
summary judgment for State Termite and the Inspector and dismissed the complaint. The Hosfords appealed to the Supreme
Court of Mississippi.
Privity of Contract
The Supreme Court of Mississippi rejected State Termite's lack
of privity of contract argument.
The court looked to a state statute
in which the Mississippi Legislature had declared that privity of
contract would not be a prerequisite to any suit for personal injury,
property damage, or economic loss
brought under negligence, strict
liability, or breach of warranty.
Miss. Code Ann. 11-7-20 (1991).
Because the Hosford's action
against State Termite alleged negligence, there was no legal consequence to the fact that the Hosfords did not have a contract with
State Termite. Thus, State Termite
could not assert lack of privity of
contract as a defense.
Foreseeability
The Mississippi Supreme Court
also rejected State Termite's defense of lack of foreseeability. The
court looked to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts 552 (1977) which
68

states that one who, in the course
of business, supplies false information due to a failure to exercise
reasonable care or competence in
obtaining or communicating the
information is liable to those who
justifiably rely upon the information in their business transactions.
However, under the Restatement,
the supplier of false information is
only liable to those whom he
knows will use the information.
The court also cited an analogous
case that extended liability to those
whom the supplier knows or reasonably should know will use the
information. Therefore, the fact
that McCrary, and not the Hos-
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fords, requested the termite inspection was not decisive.
Because the record clearly reflected that McCrary bought and
sold houses professionally, the
court charged State Termite with
inferential knowledge that
McCrary was not planning to live
in the house but would probably
use the termite inspection report in
connection with the sale of the
house to another. Thus, the court
found that both State Temite and
the Inspector reasonably should
have foreseen that McCrary's immediate purchaser would obtain
and rely on the inspection report.
In fact, the Hosfords did receive
the report shortly after it was issued and did rely on its accurateness in purchasing the house.
Therefore, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the circuit
court's decision and remanded the
case for further proceedings.
Daniel Hynes

Consumer Reliance On
Statements About
Pre-Existing Condition
Coverage Creates
Potential Liability For
Insurance Company
In Peek v. Reserve National Insurance Company, 585 So. 2d 1303
(Ala. 1991), the Supreme Court of
Alabama held that an insurance
company could be liable for breach
of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation when consumers relied
on an insurance agent's statements
about pre-existing condition coverage and the company later refused
to pay the claim. The court also
held, however, that the insurance
company did not act in bad faith.
Background
On September 3, 1985, Rayburn
and Eve Peek ("the Peeks") met
with Lee Porter, Jr. ("Porter"), an
agent of Reserve National Insurance Company ("Reserve National"), to purchase major medical
health insurance for their family.
At that time, the Peeks disclosed to
Porter that their daughter had previously suffered menstrual difficulVolume 4 Number 2/Winter, 1992

